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EVALUATING A NEW LOGICAL ARGUMENT 
FROM EVIL
Bruce Langtry
J. L. Schellenberg, in “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” argues that (if God 
exists) God has, of necessity, a disappreciation of evil, operating at a meta-
level in such a way as to give God a non-defeasible reason to rule out actualiz-
ing a world containing evil. He also argues that since God’s motive in creating 
the world is to share with finite beings the good that God experiences prior 
to creation, which is good without evil, it follows that God will create a world 
that contains no evil. I  investigate in detail the foregoing lines of argument 
and provide grounds for rejecting them.
J. L. Schellenberg’s chapter “A New Logical Problem of Evil”1 extends his 
earlier substantial work on God and evil by arguing that the proposition 
There is evil in the world is incompatible with the conjunction of the follow-
ing three propositions:
* Unsurpassable greatness (UG): God is the greatest possible being.
* Ontological Independence (OI): No world created by God (or any part thereof) 
is a part of God.
* Prior Purity (PP): Prior to creation (whether “prior” be taken logically or 
temporally) there is no evil in God of any kind.
Schellenberg offers two different “approaches” to establishing the incom-
patibility.2 Each of these consists of a core argument which is nested within 
lines of thought directly supporting its premises and defending it from 
likely objections. Both approaches rest on intuitively appealing assump-
tions, and are worthy of respect. Nevertheless, I will argue that neither 
approach is sustainable.3
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1After note 3, all my references to Schellenberg’s work will be to this chapter.
2In this paper, talk of necessity and possibility (and accordingly talk of compatibility,
incompatibility, and equivalence) always concerns metaphysical possibility and necessity.
3I will not discuss Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem Revisited.” It provides a fresh
exposition of the line of argument of the 2013 chapter, questioning the view “that a cor-
rect understanding of God’s nature must cohere with the notion that God would actualize a 
world at least very similar to ours, right down to the inclusion of physical things and human 
beings”; what Schellenberg says stands or falls with what he had said earlier. The 2018 paper 
also replies to criticisms of its predecessor in Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem.”
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1. THE MODELING APPROACH
1.1 The Core Modeling Argument (CModA)
(1) Every possible non-Divine good is greatly exceeded by a good of the same 
type existing in God prior to creation. [premise]
(2) Every good in a world is greatly exceeded by a good of the same type existing 
in God prior to creation. [from 1 by OI]
(3) All goodness found in God prior to creation is pure goodness: goodness- 
without-evil. [from PP]
(4) Every good in a world is greatly exceeded by a pure good of the same type 
existing in God prior to creation. [from 2, 3]
(5) Every worldly good that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a pure 
good of the same type existing in God prior to creation.4 [from 4]
(6) If every worldly good that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a 
pure good of the same type, existing prior to creation in God, then any world 
with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the 
corresponding pure goods in God. [premise]
(7) Any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world 
modeling the corresponding pure goods in God (call the latter a “greater 
world”). [from 5, 6]
(8) God can ensure the existence of greater worlds, and can do so limitlessly. 
[premise]
(9) If any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world 
modeling the corresponding pure goods in God, and the existence of greater 
worlds can limitlessly be ensured by God, then for any world X that requires 
or permits evil, there is some world Y that models pure goodness in God such 
that God has no good reason to create X rather than Y. [premise]
(10) For any world X that requires or permits evil, there is some world Y that mod-
els pure goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create X rather 
than Y. [from 7, 8, 9]
(11) If for any world X that requires or permits evil there is some world Y that 
models pure goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create 
X rather than Y, then God has no good reason to permit evil in the world. 
[premise]
(12) God has no good reason to permit evil in the world. [from 10, 11]
(13) If there is evil in the world, then God has a good reason to permit it. [premise]
(14) There is no evil in the world. [from 12, 13]
Schellenberg infers that the conjunction of UG, OI, and PP, which he 
regards as fundamental commitments of theism, is incompatible with the 
existence of evil.5 So he must accordingly treat premises (1), (6), (8), (9), 
(11), and (13) as necessary truths.
4A good’s requiring evil is presumably to be understood as its necessitating that there be
evil. It is not clear what Schellenberg means when he talks of a good’s permitting evil.
5In his footnote 5, Schellenberg explains that the phrase “if God exists” is tacitly present, 
in appropriate places, throughout the CModA.
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1.2. A Puzzle About the CModA
Consider the result of replacing, throughout (1)–(14), talk of evil by talk 
of humans and talk of pure goods by talk of human-neutral goods, where 
a human-neutral good is a good that does not entail that there exists at 
least one human. It might seem that the premises in the parallel argument 
are not less plausible than those in (1)–(14), and that if (1)–(14) is a sound 
argument for the incompatibility of There is evil with God exists then the 
parallel argument is a sound argument for the incompatibility of There are 
humans with God exists.
Let us assume, however, that Schellenberg does not regard his new log-
ical problem of evil from evil as merely a case study for a broader logical 
problem of contingent “worldly” states of affairs such as There being humans. 
So either there is some reason why each of premises (1), (6), (8), (9), and (13) 
is much more plausible than the corresponding premise of the parallel argu-
ment, or else there in at least one unstated premise located within (1)–(14), a 
premise which does not have a plausible variant involving humans.6
1.3. Clarifying Terminology and Assumptions
1.3.1. Worlds
[Quote 1] In this chapter, “world” normally refers to an imagined or actual 
reality that would be or is ontologically distinct from God and that, if God 
exists, depends or would depend for its existence on God’s creative activity. 
“The” world (or “this” world or “our” world) is the world in which we live. 
When instead I  have in mind the larger notion of a possible world, such 
as the actual world, which for theists includes both God and any created 
reality, I  shall make this clear through the relevant use of such words as 
“possible” or “actual.”7
6Is Schellenberg’s (13) much more plausible than (13*) If there are humans in the world, then 
God has a good reason to permit them? Since Schellenberg’s expression “good reason” means 
“good reason all-things-considered” and permission concerns voluntary non-prevention, the 
conditional is to be understood to be, if true, necessarily true. Now neccessarily, if humans 
exist then God permits them: he voluntarily refrains from preventing their existing. And, 
necessarily, God does not permit humans for a bad or inadequate reason. But might God 
do so without having any reason all-things-considered? How might this be the case? Not 
by God’s acting on an unmotivated desire to permit humans, since God would not act on 
such a desire if it were somehow outweighed or defeated, and an unmotivated desire to 
permit them which is neither outweighed nor defeated would provide God with a good 
all-things-considered reason to permit them. Might God permit humans by chance? The 
arrival of humans, even if it were not determined by the preceding state of the world (and 
so foreknown by God) must surely at some stage, perhaps a late stage, be expected by God. 
Since the existence of humans would be of axiological importance, it is hard to see how God 
could accidentally fail to consider whether to prevent it. I  conclude that we have strong 
grounds for believing that if God exists then (13*) is true.
7Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 35n. The “larger notion of a possible world” that 
is common to various rival accounts of the metaphysics of alethic modality developed over 
the last 60 years does not involve God’s bringing the possible worlds into existence. God, if 
God exists, does not bring the actual world into existence, though God may have brought 
into existence the Milky Way, Earth, and the atoms that are now parts of your hands.
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Schellenberg’s talk of worlds other than “our” world, and of a role for 
imagination, is presumably just a convenient manner of speaking rather 
than serious realist metaphysics. Even so, puzzles arise concerning how 
Schellenberg’s many worlds are to be individuated, and whether “we” 
live not only in “this” world but in others as well. For our purposes the 
important point is this: whether one particular world exceeds another, 
and whether one of them models pure goodness in God, supervene not 
only on which objects and what kinds of objects exist in it, but also on 
what states these objects are in at various times, how they interact with 
each other, and (in the case of finite persons at least) what actions they 
perform, their reasons for performing these actions, and so on. Therefore, 
when Schellenberg compares worlds with respect to value, he really has 
to compare world-histories—not narratives but wholes whose parts are 
token states of affairs, events and processes involving the objects included 
in the relevant worlds. So in Schellenberg’s paper the expressions “cre-
ate such-and-such a world” and “ensure the existence of such-and-such a 
world” must be interpreted, charitably, as equivalent to “actualize such-
and-such a world-history.” He does not consider whether God might opt 
for exercising merely loose supervision of whatever universe God brings 
into existence.
Perhaps Quote 1 excludes states of affairs such as God’s conversing 
with Abraham from all world-histories. If so, the exclusion is problematic, 
because many of them might be constitutively (as well as causally) rele-
vant to how good a particular world is.
1.3.2. Modeling Goods and Modeling Worlds
The CModA’s proposition (3) identifies pure goodness with good-
ness-without-evil. The idea of one good’s modeling another, pure good in 
God is introduced in the following way:
[Quote 2] A world could contain goods that “model” Divine goods both in 
richness and purity: any good that purely resembles or images or mirrors 
or reflects a pure good in God we might think of as modeling that good. (I 
understand this notion broadly. Notice especially that while every worldly 
good instances a higher goodness in God, the modeling goods need not be 
instances of the goods they model: the latter is but one way in which modeling 
can occur.)8
[Quote 3] Now just which goods we are speaking about here—goods that 
are modeled and goods that do the modeling—may of course be difficult 
to say . . . But even without being able to identify particular relevant goods, 
we can still quickly identify at least three ways in which a world with finite 
creatures but without evil could be made to grow ceaselessly in its pure reflec-
tion of the higher goods that exist without evil in God: through creatures’ 
8Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 38. Schellenberg does not assert that every 
worldly good, or even every worldly pure good, models the pure goods in God in virtue 
merely of falling under some good-type existing in God prior to creation.
233A NEW ARGUMENET FROM EVIL
propositional understanding of the pure nature of God being ever more 
enlarged; through their experiential “knowledge by acquaintance” of God’s 
pure reality being ever more enriched; and by the higher goodness that is in 
God being ever more fully embodied by creatures through what they do to 
become like God and to make their world reflect God’s pure goodness. And 
we can add a fourth way if we think of these three combined. Accordingly, 
let us assume hereafter that any world whose goods are modeling goods 
attains a level of goodness no less pure or rich than would result from the 
realization of this fourth way.9
I am unsure how to interpret Quote 3’s final sentence. Surely Schellenberg 
is not asserting that if a world lacks evil and all of its goods fulfill Quote 
2’s criterion for modeling goods then it has at least the level of goodness 
available via the fourth way. For Quote 2 leaves it open whether some 
worlds, each of whose goods models a pure good in God, are quite 
sparsely endowed with goods. I will treat the sentence as stipulating that 
a world is to count as modeling the pure goods in God if and only if it lacks 
evil and its modeling goods confer on it at least the level of rich goodness 
available via the fourth way. On this account, there might be many such 
worlds differing from each other in their respective degrees of goodness 
and in the specific bundles of goods they contain.
1.3.3. Orderings of Worlds
As the CModA’s proposition (6) indicates, Schellenberg uses the word 
“exceeds” for a relation between goods and also for a relation between 
worlds. He does not formally define “exceeds” but he offers an informal 
explanation of its meaning in the paragraph that introduces premise (1). 
It is fair to say that he regards “exceeds” as equivalent to “better than.” 
I assume that “exceeds” expresses the converse of the relation expressed 
by “is less great than” in Quote 4.  For proposition (7) stipulates that a 
world modeling the pure goods in God is to be called a “greater” world in 
virtue of its exceeding any world with goods permitting or requiring evil.
There is also at least one other value-based way of ordering worlds that 
Schellenberg recognizes. Commenting on (9), he says:
[Quote 4] There are some important conceptual distinctions to take account 
of in understanding the content of its antecedent. It is one thing for X to be 
less great than Y, another for X to contribute less well than Y to representing 
the good that is in God, and yet another for X, unlike Y, to permit or require 
evil. If the antecedent of (9) is true, then for any world X that requires or per-
mits evil, there is always some world Y God can produce in relation to which 
it falls short in all three of these ways. In such circumstances, God could not 
acquire a good reason to create X rather than Y.10
Quote 4 involves the view that God’s reasons for choosing a specific world 
to create include, or might include, not only its location in a series of 
9Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 38–39.
10Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 40–41.
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worlds ordered by exceeds but also its location in a series of worlds ordered 
by contributes better to representing the good that is in God than (which is pre-
sumably equivalent to more deeply reflects the goods possessed by God). Let us 
call an infinite series of worlds ordered in the first way an E-series, and call 
a world’s location in an E-series its E-rank; let us call an infinite series of 
worlds ordered in the second way a C-series, and call a world’s location 
in a C-series its C-rank.11 Schellenberg would say that for any world X that 
contains evil there is a world Y that contains no evil and has both a higher 
E-rank and a higher C-rank than X has.
1.4. What if God is Faced with a Sigma-Series or a Tau-Series?
Let a Mod-world be a world that models the pure goods in God. Let a non-
bad world be a world in which the goods are not collectively outweighed 
by evils. Let X-worlds be non-bad worlds containing both good and evil. 
And let a Sigma-series be an E-series such that
* its first rank is occupied by at least one non-bad world,
* the second rank is occupied by at least one X-world,
* each X-world is followed (immediately, or after some higher ranks occu-
pied by X-worlds) by a Mod-world that exceeds every preceding world, and
* each Mod-world is followed (immediately, or after some higher ranks 
occupied by Mod-worlds) by an X-world that exceeds every preceding 
world, and
* God can actualize any member of the series.12
Neither Quote 3 nor anything else that Schellenberg has said provides 
a way for him to rule out all the non-bad worlds’ making up a Sigma-
series. Consider any Mod-world M, and let Xa contain the same created 
persons as M, each of whom possesses all the goods he or she possesses 
in M and many additional rich modeling goods, though some of these 
created persons also experience some fairly mild evils that are greatly 
outweighed by the goods that he or she possesses. (Given that there is 
at least one Mod-world, there is no reason to doubt that there is at least 
one world fulfilling the foregoing description of Xa.) Although Xa is not a 
Mod-world, Schellenberg would find it hard to maintain that Xa does not 
exceed M.
If the non-bad worlds constitute a Sigma-series, then for every Mod-
world there is an X-world that exceeds it. If we were to regard the CModA’s 
argument for its proposition (9) as confining itself to considerations about 
11I also stipulate that in E-series and C-series different worlds can have the same rank, that 
differences in rank cannot supervene on infinitely small differences between other features 
of the worlds, and that a greater difference in rank must supervene on a greater difference 
with respect to other features of the worlds.
12All bad worlds are exceeded by worlds occupying the first rank of an E-series; stipulat-
ing that bad worlds are not part of the series simplifies the exposition.
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E-ranks, and to assume that non-bad worlds constitute a Sigma-series, 
then we would be able to construct a parallel, equally meritorious argu-
ment of which the following is the part relevant here:
(7*) Any Mod-world is exceeded by some X-world
(8*) God can ensure the existence of any X-world in the Sigma-series
(9*) If God can ensure the existence of any X-world in the Sigma-series, then 
for any Mod-world M there is at least one X-world such that God has no 
good reason to create M rather than the X-world13
(10*) For any Mod-world M, there is some X-world such that God has no 
reason to create M rather than the X-world. [from 7*, 8*, 9*]
But Quote 4 indicates (and my Section 1.2 confirms) that the CModA is not 
adequately represented by propositions (1)–(14) and it does not confine 
itself to considerations about E-ranks.
Points essentially the same as those made in the preceding two para-
graphs could also be made in terms of Tau-series instead of Sigma-series, 
where (I stipulate) a Tau-series has a structure similar to that of a Sigma 
series, but the relation in terms of which a Tau-series of worlds is ordered 
is better represents the good that is in God. To see this, consider worlds M 
and Xa, fulfilling the conditions specified a few paragraphs ago. M is with 
respect to purity a better representation of divine goodness than Xa. But M 
is not in every respect so. For surely Xa is with respect to abundance of goods 
included in the respective worlds a better representation of the richness of 
divine goodness than M. So the way is open for the conjecture that M and 
Xa are members of a Tau series. In that case, alongside Schellenberg’s argu-
ment for the CModA’s proposition (10), there is an argument for (10*) that 
involves better represents the good that is in God rather than exceeds.
Suppose that both (10) and (10*) were true. If God has resolved to create 
a world rather than to exercise somewhat loose supervision of whichever 
universe God brings into existence, what considerations would guide 
God’s decision about which world to create? In one respect, the situation 
would be similar to other cases in which an agent faces a choice from 
an infinite series of better and better alternatives: for any given option, 
there is an alternative one such that the agent has no reason to choose the 
former rather than the latter. The agent should satisfice.14 Plainly, some 
divine decisions of which world to actualize would be superior to others; 
but what further considerations should guide God’s choice?
At this point, we should take into account the following remarks, made 
in Schellenberg’s discussion of proposition (9):
[Quote 5] Given Prior Purity together with Unsurpassable Greatness, there is 
no limit to the richness of value assimilable, without evil, by finite persons in 
13In (9*) “reason” means “all-things-considered reason,” just as in (9) it does.
14I argued at length in favour of this claim in Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil, Chapter 3.
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pursuit of the infinite. The point is that to improve itself, a finite world must, 
as it were, seek to close the distance between itself and God—an incomplet-
able task, to be sure, and one that could find limitlessly many forms, but this 
is nonetheless the direction such value-related endeavor must take, and in 
this direction there is no evil to be encountered.15
[Quote 6] [For any worlds X, Y such that X requires or permits evil and Y 
models pure goodness in God,] X will also win a less deep noncomparative 
appreciation from God than Y, and, unlike Y, which warrants no disappre-
ciation at all, X or its conditions must furthermore win some disapprecia-
tion, insofar as they are bound up with evil. Such facts contribute to the 
overwhelmingly powerful defeater that a God would have for any reason 
apparently supporting the permission of evil.16
[Quote  7] Perhaps some philosophers would contest the idea that the 
presence or possibility of evil is something that would in itself be given 
weight by a Divine mind. But consider the infinitely good life of God, as 
imagined by theism. Suppose—perhaps per impossibile—that there could 
be a counterpart life as valuable, though included in it was some evil-
turned-to-good. If the relevant facts about evil were not independently 
forceful, should it not be a matter of indifference which life God led? And 
yet for the theist it emphatically is not. God, as we have seen, realizes the 
unblemished ideal of a reality unlimitedly and exclusively good. There 
appears to be an intuition about purity, and perhaps also about simplicity, 
operating at a meta-level here. God is a less pure reality if evil as well as 
good is realized in God—and God is a less simple being if, of the available 
options, evil and good, both appear in God. The logical argument from 
evil can make use of these ideas. For is not the presence or possibility of its 
diminished purity and simplicity, in these senses, going to detract at the 
meta-level in question from what God sees when God considers X [a world 
that contains evil]?17
Quotes 6 and 7 indicate that Schellenberg would say that if God were 
faced with a Sigma-series or a Tau-series, God would exclude from can-
didature for creation all worlds containing evil. The rest of this section 
explains why Quotes 5–7 fail to provide much support either for the fore-
going claim or for the one made in the last clause in Quote 5.
Quote 5’s second sentence seems to entail that for any two worlds if one 
is an improvement on the other then the former contains less evil than the 
latter. But worlds M and Xa, described earlier in this section, jointly pro-
vide a counterexample. Furthermore, in general one world might in some 
respects be closer to God than some other world, but in other respects 
more distant from God. Why does the presence of evil in some specific 
world establish that it is more distant all-things-considered from God than 
15Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 40.
16Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem Evil,” 41. Schellenberg uses “disappreciate” for the 
opposite of “appreciate,” where “to appreciate” obviously means “to value.”
17Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 41–42.
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any world from which evil is absent? Since no answer is provided in Quote 
5, we should consider whether Quotes 6 and 7 provide one.18
Let Ya be a world containing no evil, but having a very low E-rank and 
a very low C-rank—for example, in virtue of the fact that it contains a 
small population of animals who lead short but good lives, and contains 
no created persons. Schellenberg would say that God has a low degree of 
appreciation for Ya but does not disappreciate it at all. Compare Ya with 
Xa. Since Xa contains much more to appreciate than Ya does, a lot to greatly 
appreciate, and very little to disappreciate, why would God not appreci-
ate Xa more than Ya? And if God were to appreciate Xa more than world 
Ya, then surely God would not disappreciate Xa (even though, no doubt, 
God would mildly disappreciate the evils in Xa). Since neither Quote 6 nor 
Quote 5 does much to counter the foregoing line of thought, neither quote 
provides a good argument for Schellenberg’s opinion that God possesses 
an overwhelmingly powerful defeater for any reason apparently support-
ing God’s permitting the evil that world Xa contains.
Quote 7 involves a thought-experiment concerning which, Schellenberg 
says, an intuition about purity appears to be operating at a meta-level, i.e., 
operating above or outside considerations merely about worlds’ locations 
in an E-series and/or a C-series. The thought-experiment involves two 
imagined alternative life-histories of God which have the same E-rank or 
C-rank but which differ because in one yet not the other there is some 
evil-turned-to-good. Now, necessarily, God never performs an evil action 
and is never in an evil state. So one of the imagined lives must involve 
God’s life’s being in some other way involved with evil—perhaps by 
God’s allowing evil or intentionally causing it, and thereby conferring on 
finite persons various outweighing goods. Schellenberg has to claim that 
necessarily, any imagined life of the latter kind is incompatible with God’s 
purity, with God’s own life’s fulfilling “the unblemished ideal of a reality 
unlimitedly and exclusively good.” But he does not argue that this is so. 
He needs to. He also needs to explain and support his assertion that God 
18Two other remarks on pp. 40–41 are worth brief attention. (i) As for less faithfully repre-
senting the pure goodness of God: how could this quality fail to be given weight by a theist who has 
reflected sufficiently on Unsurpassable Greatness and who is devoted above all to appreciating God? 
Few theists will fail to give some weight to the quality; but what is required is an account 
of exactly how the weight is to be assessed and taken into account alongside other weighty 
considerations about the relevant worlds. Anyway, why should we believe that, in my exam-
ple, world Xa less faithfully represents the pure goodness of God, all things considered, than 
world M does? (ii) The good of finite beings in a world including God is bound up with growing 
more fully into a multifaceted awareness of God, and this, given Prior Purity, evil could only hinder. 
Why mightn’t there be cases in which the arrival of evil in an individual’s previously evil-
free life opens up opportunities for, rather than hindering, the individual’s growing more 
fully into a multifaceted awareness of God? (Notice that the issue here is not whether God 
could produce a multifaceted awareness of God without allowing evil in the individual’s life: 
it is whether italicised remark (ii) is true. In this paper I am not engaging in theodicy, but in 
“defence” against a logical argument from evil.) Furthermore, is growth into a multi-faceted 
awareness of God the only good-type that is relevant?
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is a less simple being if God has the option of causing or allowing evil: 
replace “evil” by “humans” or “horses”; if the original assertion about 
divine simplicity is true, why isn’t the new one?
The CModA’s proposition (8) implies that there is at least one E-series 
E(mod) composed entirely of worlds that model the corresponding pure 
goods in God. But this is compatible with E(mod)’s members’ constitut-
ing a subset of the members of a Sigma-series and/or of a Tau series, in 
which case each member of E(mod) is exceeded by a world which con-
tains evil (and which therefore is not a member of E(mod)). If so, then 
Schellenberg’s argument for (10) is matched by a parallel argument for 
(10*). So Quotes 6 and 7 do not provide support for the proposition that 
if the non-bad worlds constitute a Sigma-series and/or a Tau-series then 
God will satisfice by choosing a world without evil.
This section has identified two major problems with Schellenberg’s line 
of argument:
* God’s formal presentation of the CModA, i.e., (1)–(14), fails because there 
is no apparent way of ruling out the non-bad worlds’ constituting a Sigma 
series and/or a Tau series, and hence the CModA’s case for lemma (10) is 
paralleled by an equally meritorious case for (10*);
* it is not implausible to suppose that there are good worlds V and W such 
that V contains evil and W does not, yet V is an improvement on W and bet-
ter represents the good that God intends than W does, and God appreciates 
V more than W.
1.5. A Variety of Meta-Level Considerations
If disappreciation of evil operates somehow at a meta-level in divine plan-
ning, then perhaps there are also other concerns that do. Humans often 
have well-grounded non-deontological, value-based sensitivities, of kinds 
that are respected and sometimes admired by people who do not share 
them, and that lead individuals who have them to depart from what will 
maximize net goodness. Consider, for example, a doctor working in a ref-
ugee camp accommodating many very sick people: she learns that her 
husband is ill and likely to die within a month or two, and leaves two 
days later to return home, acting on a meta-level concern to care for her 
husband and family. That is, even if she takes into account the total value 
expected to result from the various alternatives open to her, her concern 
to care for her husband and family generates reasons for action that are 
above and beyond considerations merely about total expected value.
Perhaps, then, God has a special, contingent concern that there be finite 
persons of a certain kind—for example, that they have emotions, that they 
seek and flourish in intimate relationships, and that many of them possess 
the natural endowments that foster the creation and love of great poetry, 
drama, and music—even if any world that contains persons of that kind 
is exceeded by a world that doesn’t. The specific way God implemented 
the concern might take account of how the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of 
such concerns in a world was related to a world’s E-rank and to its C-rank 
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but would not be fixed solely by their effects on E-rank and C-rank. There 
might also be other meta-level considerations, and trade-offs might be 
made.19 I will focus here on the following conjecture, (β), of which I claim 
merely that it is epistemically possible that (β) is true:
(β) If God exists then God has a strong concern that there be persons whose 
lives involve both (i) a significant degree of freedom and moral responsibil-
ity for actions greatly affecting their own or other people’s level of well-be-
ing, and also (ii) intimate relationships involving mutual vulnerability and 
trust.
The claim that (β) is epistemically possible receives some degree of sup-
port from widely-shared beliefs about what is valuable in human lives. In 
our world, vulnerability to close friends and family members, accompa-
nied by trust in them, are treasured gifts that each individual bestows on 
the other. The trust is not merely of instrumental value. If intimate fam-
ily relationships, for example, typically involved little need for trust, not 
merely because of each member’s belief that the others were virtuous and 
competent, but instead because, typically, everyone in the family knew 
that nothing important could go badly wrong in the family whatever the 
character and level of competence of each individual, then parent-child 
interaction and marriages would lack much of the significance we hope 
for when we enter them.20
Schellenberg’s main conclusion is:
(γ) Necessarily, if God exists then there is no evil.
Necessarily, if (γ) were true, and if God were to exist, then the following 
would be true:
(δ) There is no evil, and if there are finite persons then they have no con-
trol over whether, and no freedom or moral responsibility with respect to 
whether, they cause or voluntarily refrain from preventing at least one evil 
event or state of affairs; furthermore, if there are finite persons then for every 
finite person FP, whether or not FP causes evils or voluntarily refrains from 
preventing them is fixed independently of FP’s character traits, desires, 
intentions, beliefs, skills, and other distinctive characteristics.
Compatibilists are apt to object that this is not so. If God were to caus-
ally determine that you never caused or allowed an instance of evil then 
God might well have decided to do so in the light of your character traits, 
desires, and so on; and God might implement God’s decision via causal 
19Various points made in the rest of this section were developed in greater detail in 
Langtry, God, The Best, and Evil, Chapter 7.
20If God were to exist and people living in communities were to believe that nothing 
important could go wrong in interpersonal relationships and their belief was false, then their 
belief would have to be due to either massive cognitive bad luck, very widespread, serious 
cognitive malfunctioning, or gross deception by God, each of which would be difficult to 
reconcile with the truth of (γ).
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chains that included these distinctive matters in ways such that you would 
be free and morally responsible with respect to many of your actions and 
omissions.
The foregoing compatibilist points, however, do not rule out my claim 
that (γ) and God exists together entail (δ). Compatibilists distinguish 
between two kinds of circumstance that determine that finite persons do 
not perform a specific action: (i) those that are compatible with our freely 
refraining from performing it, and being morally responsible for refrain-
ing, and (ii) those that are not. Everyday examples of kind (ii) include, for 
example, human physiological characteristics that prevent anyone’s run-
ning a marathon in 30 minutes, and various neurological conditions that 
prevent people with advanced dementia from doing things they could 
previously do with ease.
Given the truth of (γ), God’s existing would be a circumstance of kind 
(ii). It would not be an “initial condition” relevantly similar, say, to the state 
of a healthy, unmanipulated person’s brain and body immediately before 
she acts or does not act: instead, it would be amongst the most fundamen-
tal structural features of reality. God’s existing would be a circumstance 
fixing the complete absence of evil from the world, and its doing so would 
be metaphysically prior any finite person’s coming into existence, and a 
fortiori prior to the person’s character traits, desires and other distinctive 
characteristics. So even compatibilists should acknowledge that given the 
truth of (γ), God’s existing would be incompatible with finite persons’ 
being free and morally responsible in refraining from causing evil.
If God has the concerns identified in (β), and God brings into existence 
complex communities of finite persons, then God has a substantial pro 
tanto reason to refrain from preventing there being any evil. It is prima 
facie possible that God has those concerns and thus the pro tanto reason. 
But if God were to know that (γ) is true then God would not have the pro 
tanto reason, just as if a human person knows that it is impossible that 
there be a greatest prime number then he or she does not have a genuine 
pro tanto reason to prove that there is one—however much he or she likes 
to daydream about becoming famous by discovering a proof. Hence there 
is a good case, based on the possibility that God has the concerns identi-
fied in (β), for believing that (γ) is false.
Section 1.4 established that Schellenberg’s arguments for (γ) are at best 
seriously incomplete—perhaps irremediably so. Therefore the case for 
believing that God has a good reason all-things-considered for allowing 
there to be evil is undefeated by those arguments.
1.6. Summing Up: The Modellng Approach
Suppose that you are disappointed that your daughter does not want 
to study Philosophy as part of her university degree, or you have an 
unpleasant half-hour walking home soaked by the heavy rain, or you 
make an arithmetical error when working out how much you spent on 
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food last week. Such occurrences, considered in themselves, are typically 
unwelcome, but surely they lack the axiological seriousness required for 
counting as evils. Although none of them occur in God’s own life, pre-
sumably they could have a place within a finite person’s life that involves 
increasingly great and rich goods, amongst which is an increasingly deep 
experience of God. If so, then why couldn’t the presence of some evil be 
accommodated within a finite person’s life of the foregoing kind? With 
respect to the evil, the individual’s life would not be mirroring the goods 
in God’s life, just as with respect to disappointment, and so on, it would 
not be mirroring God’s own life; but in many other respects it would be. 
If Schellenberg were to say that a life that involves increasingly great 
and rich goods including an increasingly deep experience of God could 
not also involve disappointments, and so on, then it would seem that 
Schellenberg’s New Logical Problem of Evil foreshadows supposed new 
logical problems of many features of human life that do not count as evils. 
Schellenberg has not provided a way of dismissing the hypothesis that the 
non-bad worlds constitute a Sigma-series or a Tau-series. Accordingly, the 
wonderful nature of the Fourth Way does not rule out God’s actualizing 
an X-world selected from one or both series. Schellenberg would say that 
God has, of necessity, a special concern for purity in created reality, and 
accordingly a disappreciation of evil, operating at a meta-level in such a 
way as to give God a non-defeasible reason to rule out God’s actualizing 
an X-world. But as I have indicated, he has not established that this is so.
In short, Sections 1.4–1.6 have shown that the Modeling Approach does 
not deliver its main conclusion (γ).
2. The Motives Approach
After explaining the main ideas of the approach, Schellenberg says, “I am 
now ready to put all of this into the form of a logical proof.” Although it 
presupposes UG, OI, and PP, the “proof” (to be read as a reductio of the 
existence of God) is as follows:
(1) God’s motive in creating the world is the motive to share the good with finite 
beings (and/or relevantly similar motives). [premise]
(2) The unsurpassable good God experiences precreation—the only good God 
might wish to share in creation—is good-without-evil. [premise]
(3) God’s motive in creating the world is the motive to share with finite beings 
good- without-evil. [from 1, 2]
(4) If God’s motive in creating the world is the motive to share with finite beings 
good-without-evil, then there is no evil in the world. [premise]
(5) There is no evil in the world. [from 3, 4]
(6) There is evil in the world. [premise]
(7) There is evil in the world and there is no evil in the world.21 [from 5, 6]
21Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 44–45.
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Let us call (1)–(7) the core Motives argument (cMotA). Proposition (1) is 
advanced in the following context:
[Quote 8] Here are the motives standardly ascribed to God. God, it may be 
said, creates to share the good with finite beings. Or, more specifically, God 
may be said to create finite beings to enter into a relationship of love with 
them and to facilitate their love for each other. Somewhat differently, it may 
be said that God’s creation amounts to an overflowing or diffusion of the 
good that is in God (the motive here would presumably be something like a 
desire to expand the range of the good for its own sake), or that God creates 
to display the glory of God. These answers have been quite popular in the 
various theological traditions of theism, and it seems that an inclusive dis-
junction referring to them all will be necessarily true. For either God creates 
for its own sake or for the sake of created things or for God, or else God is 
motivated in all of these ways. There are no other options.22
Schellenberg would say that although God does not possess bodily health, 
it is “fundamentally realized” in God, in some non-physical form.23 Even 
so, the cMotA’s proposition (2) says that God wishes to share in creation 
only those goods that God experiences precreation; and God does not experi-
ence bodily health precreation. So Schellenberg seems committed to main-
taining that God does not wish to share bodily health in creation. In that 
case, premises (1) and (2) together commit him to
(3a) God’s motive in creating the world is the motive to share with finite 
beings both good-without-evil and good-without-bodily-health.
And since Schellenberg affirms (4), it is hard to see how he can deny
(4a) If God’s motive in creating the world is the motive to share with finite 
beings both good-without-evil and good-without-bodily-health, then there 
is no bodily-health in the world, and avoid maintaining that he has a sound 
argument from bodily health against the existence of God.
Plainly, there is some error in (1)–(3). Let us agree with Schellenberg’s that 
God’s primary motive in creating the consists of one, or the conjunction 
of several, of those listed in Quote 8. There might surely, however, also 
be secondary motives as well: for example, to observe and occasionally 
interact with rich, interesting communities of finite persons. If in the 
cMotA’s proposition (1) “God’s motive” is to be understood as meaning 
“God’s only motive” then (1) is suspect. If, however, in (1) and (3) “God’s 
motive” means “God’s primary, most important motive,” then (4) is sus-
pect because the conjunction of (1) and (2) fails to rule out God’s having 
some additional motive whose fulfilment entails God’s not preventing 
there being some evil.
If in propositions (1)–(4) “x shares good g with y” is to be interpreted 
as merely “x confers good g on y” then it is highly doubtful that premise 
22Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 43.
23Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 44, where the two sentences beginning “God 
is not physical . . .” are surely to be interpreted in the light of the CModA’s proposition (2).
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(2) is true, since surely God might be motivated to confer various goods 
on finite beings that are not part of the unsurpassable good that God 
experiences prior to creation—e.g., the capacities underlying proficiency 
at playing piano sonatas—and that are neither entailed nor explained by 
the motives identified in Quote 8. So should we interpret “x shares good 
g with y” as “x already possesses g and brings it about that y has g as 
well?” If so, then consider the second divine motive identified in Quote 8, 
namely, to enter into a relationship of love with them [finite beings] and to facil-
itate their love for each other. The fact that unsurpassable good God experi-
ences precreation is good-without-bodies is obviously no barrier to God’s 
fulfilling this motive; and though some specific kinds of evil might be a 
barrier, there might be particular instances of evil that need not be—for 
example, such-and-such an individual’s blindness. So God’s acting on the 
motive is compatible with there being evil. For related reasons, so is God’s 
acting on the other motives mentioned in Quote 9.
Let us now take into account the following remarks, which comple-
ment Quote 3:
[Quote 9] Take away free will as we (seem to) know it, with all the concom-
itant possibilities of evil, introducing more acquaintance with the purity of 
God, and what do you have? A flat insipid existence? Hardly! Finite persons 
at whatever level, in terms of capacities, could in such circumstances strain 
everlastingly to reach new levels in the experience and embodiment of God, 
potentially achieving new glories with every step through the pertinent 
exercise of free will. As my word “strain” suggests, we have significance and 
dignity aplenty—in part because of innumerable opportunities for jubilant 
and invigorating work, intellectually, emotionally, spiritually, imaginatively, 
and so on—in a scenario of the sort I have laid alongside the theodicist’s 
overfamiliar picture involving free will and evil.24
Section 1.6 expresses my response to Quote 9, and also to a generalization 
of Schellenberg’s point namely that there is nothing that might motivate 
God to permit evil in the world, when (i) God can actualize a wonder-
ful world without evil, containing finite persons whose lives are always 
very good, and (ii) for every world that contains evil there is a better one 
that does not. My own view is that if (γ) were true, then the scope of free 
will (whether seen in libertarian or compatibilist terms) could be wide, 
including choices affecting the levels of good finite persons enjoyed at any 
given time but not including an individual’s causing evil or allowing evil 
to occur; nevertheless, as I argued in Section 1.5, considerations concern-
ing free will provide God with a pro tanto reason to refrain from ensuring 
that no finite persons ever cause evil.
Thus the Motives Approach is no more successful than the Modeling 
Approach as an argument for atheism.
University of Melbourne
24Schellenberg, “New Logical Problem,” 43–44.
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